Other Intune-related topics, including unsupported scenarios and platform-specific behaviors
Use App Control for Business (WDAC) as the primary control, not execution policy, for this requirement.
Key points supported by Microsoft guidance:
- Execution policy is not sufficient for interactive restriction
Restrictedblocks.ps1files, but the requirement is to stop users from opening PowerShell and typing or pasting commands. The supported control for that scenario is application control, not execution policy. - Prefer App Control for Business over AppLocker Microsoft states that App Control for Business is the preferred application control system for Windows and recommends implementing application control with App Control for Business rather than AppLocker. AppLocker still works, but Microsoft is no longer investing in it beyond security fixes.
- How App Control helps with the exact split needed
Under a lockdown policy:
- Interactive PowerShell runs in
ConstrainedLanguagemode. - Scripts and modules are evaluated per file by policy.
- Approved files can run in
FullLanguagemode. - Unapproved files are either blocked or forced into
ConstrainedLanguagemode, depending on policy.
- Interactive PowerShell runs in
- What this means for Intune and approved automation
The practical model is:
- Keep PowerShell available on the device.
- Use App Control policy so interactive sessions are constrained.
- Explicitly approve trusted scripts/modules used by Intune and CloudOps so they can run as trusted content.
- Treat all other scripts as untrusted so they are blocked or constrained by policy.
- How PowerShell distinguishes trusted vs untrusted under policy
In noninteractive execution, PowerShell uses the App Control API to determine whether a file is:
- allowed in
FullLanguage - blocked
- allowed only in
ConstrainedLanguage
- allowed in
- Recommended rule design
To avoid overly broad exceptions:
- Approve only the specific scripts, modules, or signing certificates used by approved automation.
- Prefer explicit approvals over broad wildcard-style allowances.
- For modules, Microsoft specifically recommends avoiding wildcard function exports and avoiding script dot-sourcing patterns that can create injection risk under lockdown.
- Audit-first pilot approach
Start in Audit mode before enforcement.
- PowerShell 7.4 supports App Control policies in audit mode.
- In audit mode, behavior does not change, but PowerShell logs what restrictions would apply.
- The documented event is Event ID 16387 in the
PowerShellCore/Analyticevent log.
- Build the App Control policy on a test machine.
- Put the policy in Audit mode.
- Run the full Intune and CloudOps automation set on pilot devices.
- Review the PowerShell audit events to identify scripts/modules that would be constrained or blocked.
- Add only the necessary approvals for those trusted files or signing certificates.
- Move a small pilot group to Enforce mode.
- Expand gradually after validating provisioning, configuration, and deployment workflows.
- AppLocker fit AppLocker can control apps for specific users or groups and can allow or deny apps based on file properties. If AppLocker is already deployed, it can be used, but Microsoft recommends App Control for Business as the strategic choice.
- Important behavior under lockdown
Even trusted scripts running in
FullLanguagecan still have some restrictions on a locked-down system. Microsoft documents examples such as restrictions around wildcard exports, certain type conversions in interactive constrained sessions, andEnter-PSHostProcessbeing disabled. This matters for testing because some automation may need adjustment even when trusted. - Logging and layered controls A strong combination from the documented guidance is:
- App Control for Business as the main enforcement layer
- PowerShell logging enabled and collected
- Latest supported PowerShell versions
- Validation of script parameters to reduce injection risk
What is not supported by the available documentation:
- A documented Microsoft statement here that specifically maps Intune Management Extension process identity to a ready-made WDAC/AppLocker exception pattern.
- A documented statement here on the exact impact of GPO execution policy
Restrictedon Intune Management Extension scripts.
Based on the supported guidance, the safest Microsoft-aligned approach is:
- Do not rely on execution policy for this objective.
- Do not blanket-block
powershell.exe. - Use App Control for Business to constrain interactive use and explicitly trust only approved automation content.
- Pilot in Audit mode first, then enforce gradually.